POLICY LESSONS FROM NATURAL RESOURCES PROJECTS IN HAITI: A
FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 



By
T. Anderson White
Hans M. Gregersen



Policy Brief No. 9, 6 pages, December 1994



For more information or copies of this publication, contact:

Hans Gregersen
Department of Forest Resources
University of Minnesota
115 Green Hall
1530 N. Cleveland Ave.
St. Paul,  MN  USA  55108

Tel: (612) 624-6298
Fax: (612) 625-5212
Email: hgregers@mercury.forestry.umn.edu



Produced by:

Ellen A. Maurer
Communications Director
EPAT/MUCIA
University of Wisconsin
1003 WARF Office Building
610 Walnut Street
Madison, WI  USA  53705  

Tel: (608) 263-4781
Fax: (608) 265-2993
Email: eamaurer@facstaff.wisc.edu



Edited by Ellen Maurer
Layout and Design by Lesa Langan


* Some figures and/or tables included in the printed version of
this publication could not be included in this electronic
version.  If you need copies of these figures or tables, please
contact the author.  




PROJECT INFORMATION



A USAID-funded global program, the Environmental and Natural
Resources Policy and Training Project (EPAT), is implemented, in
part, by 15 universities and development organizations through
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EPAT/MUCIA has research, training, and communication components
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Associates, Inc.; and World Resources Institute.

Policy Brief ISSN # 1072-9496




POLICY LESSONS FROM NATURAL RESOURCES PROJECTS IN HAITI: A
FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM



Haiti is currently undergoing its largest economic crisis and
political opportunity of this century.  We present this brief,
and the accompanying working paper, [note 1] in the hope that
policymakers will be able to make the reforms necessary for
Haiti's development.  We hope this brief can help point the way
for discussions about that reform.

Rural poverty exists and has increased because of longstanding
political, economic, and cultural divisions.  The divisions occur
among the poor rural majority, the small middle class, and the
merchant and military elite.  

Taxes on rural production, coupled with a lack of government
investments in public services and rural areas, reinforce the
divisions.  Indirectly, they lead to deforestation, land
degradation, and poverty.  

More direct causes of poverty and degradation are the pervasive
insecurity facing Haiti's people and deficit in production
resources (land and capital).  Another cause is the limited
opportunity for expansion of off-farm employment that would
reduce pressure on the land.  

Because they were seen as a political threat, past governments
repressed local organizations that form the basis for democratic
development. 

Reversing the trend of land degradation and poverty in Haiti will
be a slow and difficult process.  It will require substantial
policy reform, administrative reorganization, and more effective
use of donor funds.



Key Lessons From Experience


Seven general conclusions emerge from recent assessments of the
impacts of natural resource projects and policies 
in Haiti. 

1. The government has enacted hundreds of well-stated laws and
regulations to protect the environment and rural productivity. 
However, they are ineffective and regularly used as income
sources and instruments of coercion by rural government officials
[note 2].  To be effective, officials must have the incentive
to obey and promote the law.

2. Projects to reforest Haiti and treat degraded watersheds have
had limited and unsustained impacts.  Innovative,
farmer-oriented, soil conservation and agroforestry efforts to
boost agricultural productivity are more successful.

3. Most successful projects use local land-use technology.  They
couple natural resource activities with programs of basic
concern: credit, micro-enterprise, and animal husbandry.  The
most efficient projects have used local groups to develop and
diffuse new innovations.

4. Experience shows that people will cooperate to treat common
environmental problems if given support for their local
institutions.  Cooperation strongly correlates with membership in
rural organizations.  This evidence strongly supports addressing
"public" environmental problems by strengthening local groups.

5. Multi- and bilateral donor-sponsored projects have poor
records except in limited cases of long-term funding commitments
to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and training centers. 
Multilateral-sponsored project shortcomings often come from
confusion about objectives and multiple agenda.  

Projects also suffer from a lack of concern about sustaining
benefits after the project ends.  Usually donors have not
encouraged authentic collective action.  Nor have they used
methods that encourage new innovations for agriculture,
environment, and natural resources.

6. Though not a panacea for rural revival, soil conservation and
forestry projects sponsored by NGOs have been the most effective
and innovative. 

7. But even good projects have not been able to offset bad
sectoral policies and repressive politics.  Haiti has not
achieved rural development, despite large aid grants and
adoption of specific techniques.  The government needs major
institutional reform.  And donors must help devise new
development approaches before Haiti can reverse its degradation
and poverty.



Prerequisites for Action: Policy and Institutional Reform


Successful local action alone is not enough for rural revival. 
Sustained and extensive development will require the reform of
national policies and bureaucracies as well as strong local
action.  

To operate efficiently, Haiti should establish a positive policy
framework and encourage local action.  It also should provide
support for financial activities that local groups cannot support
by themselves.  

Before additional resources can be productive in rural areas,
Haiti needs the following three basic policy and institutional
reforms.

Reform the legal framework that governs rural Haiti.  A
reformed legal framework and administrative system is the first
and most important step towards rural revival.  It should: 

* guarantee freedom of assembly,

* guarantee due process of law,

* enable collective action to address public problems, and 

* facilitate technical and institutional innovation [note 3].  


Substantial reforms in rural administrative systems also are
necessary for effective changes.  These include reforming rural
administration to reduce graft, corruption, and extortion.

The government should review and revise the rural code
(regulations pertaining to rural areas) and the tax codes. This
would encourage farmers to adopt appropriate and promising land
use practices.  It would also help form and strengthen local
groups and enterprises.

Tax and regulatory reforms to improve farm productivity include: 

* rescinding regulations requiring government approval of tree
harvest and creating new legislation assuring owners full harvest
rights over private trees, 

* eliminating taxes on tree harvest and wood product transport to
reduce graft and tax bias against tree production, 

* reducing or eliminating market taxes for agricultural products,

and/or 

* providing tax credits to people who adopt conservation
practices [note 4].  

Reform the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural
Development (MARNDR) to serve small farmers, encourage rural
enterprises, and cooperate with NGOs.  Haiti must reform the
Ministry with new national policies.  The Ministry must be able
to deal more effectively with the real dilemmas of rural Haiti
and the capabilities of different development organizations [note
5].  Thus:

* Ministry focus should shift from promoting capital-intensive
annual row-crops and commercial timber forestry to low-input,
integrated farming systems and rural enterprise development.  

* The Ministry needs to reorganize to provide a permanent
professional presence in rural Communes.  This will help it
manage public subsidized programs and represent local needs to
national planners and administrators.  It must give
responsibility to local officials and ensure that they are
accountable to the community.  It must evaluate and reform the
national extension system.

* The Ministry must develop its capacity to plan, evaluate, and
coordinate development activities.  It must also establish
positive relations with NGOs and transfer most implementation
responsibilities and resources to local NGOs.

Devise and encourage new institutions to implement foreign aid
and strengthen NGOs.  These could include endowed development
foundations, coalitions of intermediary organizations, and
networks of local member organizations.  We envision the
following organizational roles:

* Multilaterals would strengthen government capacity to plan,
monitor, and coordinate development programs.  They would also
encourage it to expand NGO activity and effectiveness.

* Bilaterals would focus on direct support for new intermediary
NGOs.  They would fund long-term programs and monitor and adopt
programs to assure sustained impacts.

* International NGOs would focus on strengthening the ability of
local NGOs to carry out activities.  They would avoid directly
implementing public works projects to prevent compromising the
ability of international NGOs to strengthen local groups.

* The principal role of local NGOs would be to (a) strengthen
community groups; (b) enhance community access to training,
credit, and technical assistance; and (c) develop
inter-organizational linkages to improve representation in
program and policy development.



Actions and Policies for Sustainable Rural Development


Once the macropolicy and institutional reforms are in place,
policymakers need to take action in four main areas.  These
policy and program actions will help rural areas achieve
sustainable increases in income, reduced unemployment, and
increased health and security.  

Policymakers need to:

* improve basic and essential social and physical infrastructure
in rural areas,

* strengthen local groups to manage rural development,

* support development of rural microenterprises for off-farm
employment, and

* increase farmer social and economic security through legal
means and productivity enhancement.

All four actions are essential to increase overall economic
productivity and welfare of rural Haiti.  The four have certain
elements in common.  All face constraints related to lack of
adequate knowledge, resources, and local incentive to invest in
sustainable improvements.  Let us look briefly at each of the
four areas of action and policy in terms of the three
constraints.

Improve basic and essential social and physical infrastructure.
Haiti needs labor intensive projects to rebuild rural physical
infrastructure and address rural unemployment.  Projects should
include improving and maintaining roads and trails, using soil
conservation measures in public ravines, and improving local
market facilities and access.  

Other urgent needs include developing public transportation and
communication systems, providing basic schooling and training
facilities, and developing a research and extension system (see
box 1).


-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 1. Policies to Improve Basic Social and Physical
Infrastructure


To increase knowledge:

* Establish a schooling and training network that is realistic
for rural mobility.

* Establish a public dialogue to identify rural infrastructure
priorities. 


To increase resources: 

* Encourage development of local infrastructure particularly
when policymakers can define private benefits.

* Subsidize infrastructure projects where they are clearly
public goods or where local communities do not have the
resources.

* Define the roles of multi- and bilateral external aid in
funding infrastructure projects.

* Provide resources via local NGOs as coordinated by local
government officials.


To increase incentive: 

* Where possible, encourage labor-intensive infrastructure
projects that provide local employment.

* Provide initial subsidies for essential infrastructure when
local people are not sufficiently motivated to invest. 

* Develop clear rules regarding infrastructure use and encourage 
local ownership to maintain projects beyond initial investment
and construction.


-----------------------------------------------------------------



Strengthen local groups to manage rural development activities. 
Community groups are the foundation for rural development
activities.  Haitian democracy and development depend on these
groups to identify and address public problems and to articulate
concerns and demand state responsibility.  

Strengthening local groups should be a primary policy objective
of government and external aid.  In addition, policymakers should
place special emphasis on encouraging women-only groups.  They
are key to food security and are highly productive when given
access to training and capital (box 2).


-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 2. Policies to Strengthen Local Groups to Manage Rural
Development Activities


To increase knowledge: 

* Provide extension and training for local groups, not only for
technical matters, but also for management skills, legal rights,
investment, and other organizational skills.

* Simplify and clarify regulations related to local organizations
and their status.

* Encourage information networks and establish regional
information clearing houses for donor and government support,
including funding and technical information.


To increase resources: 

* Establish credit programs for local organizations.

* Establish special, sometimes subsidized, credit programs for
targeted stakeholders such as womens groups.


To increase incentive: 

* Establish explicit government declarations that rural
popular organizations are positive and fundamental groups in
national development.

* Establish rights and publicize and enforce them.


-----------------------------------------------------------------


Help develop rural microenterprises that can expand off-farm
employment.  Ultimately, rural development requires significant
amounts of productive off-farm employment.  This will decrease
the pressure on land and increase reinvestment funds for
infrastructure and public works.  

As labor shifts from agriculture to manufacturing, farmers will
consolidate farms to increase agricultural productivity.  Since
Haiti has good conditions for arboriculture, attempts to spur
micro-enterprise might focus on tree-based enterprises, such as
fruit and wood-based fuel production (box 3).


-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 3. Policies to Support Rural Microenterprises for Off-farm
Employment


To increase knowledge: 

* Provide technical support to prospective entrepreneurs.

* Provide marketing information for sale of outputs and purchase
of inputs.

* Conduct research on promising products, markets, and
transformation technologies to support microenterprise
development.

* Provide managerial training.


To increase resources: 

* Provide credit, and possibly equity, for startup and working
capital.

* Provide labor training.

* Provide access to secure sources of purchased inputs.


To increase incentive: 

* Provide subsidized credit.  Make sure that payback periods are
long enough to provide incentive for start-up.

* Provide insurance or other means to help share the risk of
start-up enterprises.   

* Establish clear legal basis for microenterprises.


-----------------------------------------------------------------


Increase rural social and economic security through laws and
improved productivity.

There is an urgent need to: 

* diminish the overall climate of fear and extortion by
government officials, 

* strengthen local organizations,

* improve farm productivity, [note 6] and 

* reform land tenure policies (box 4).


-----------------------------------------------------------------
Box 4. Policies Needed to Reduce Rural Social and Economic
Insecurity


To increase knowledge: 

* Inform rural people of their rights under policy reforms
discussed earlier.

* Provide training so farmers understand land laws and their
rights under them.

* Provide training in dispute resolution so that rural groups can
mediate land conflicts.

* Where needed, subsidize tax record surveys to establish land
tenure so farmers and the public know their property
boundaries.

* Establish standard contract forms that explicitly state land
agreements.


To increase resources: 

* Provide government-paid arbitration of land title disputes and
other legal matters.

* Provide subsidies for productivity-enhancing investments and
investments that increase agricultural sustainability.

* Subsidize crop storage facilities, establish live fencing
(especially around home gardens), and disseminate important
seeds.


To increase incentive: 

* Subsidize fencing of properties (after establishing tenure
rights) to avoid the problems of stray animals and other
encroachment.

* Inform local people of their rights under policy reforms and
existing laws.

* Inform people of their fiscal responsibilities such as taxes
and available subsidies. 


-----------------------------------------------------------------




Policy Implications


Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Haiti and its donors have
promoted an urban/manufacturing model of national development. 
They have used most funding to subsidize public projects in urban
areas.  In natural resource projects, they have often responded
to the "symptoms" of degradation rather than the underlying
"causes."   

Because of the current rural crisis and the weakness of previous
investments in rural areas, Haiti needs substantial and
carefully-crafted efforts to reverse the downward spiral of
poverty and misery.  Policymakers can succeed only if they
thoroughly reform national policy and institutions and the way in
which they implement external aid.



NOTES


1. This policy brief is a synopsis of EPAT/MUCIA Working Paper
17, POLICY LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND NATURAL RESOURCE PROJECTS IN
RURAL HAITI, by T. Anderson White (1994).  That Working Paper
is, in turn, a synthesis of seven other papers by White and
co-authors on natural resources in Haiti.  White has been working
with Haitian development issues for the past 10 years.  For
copies of Working Paper 17 contact the author. 

2. Alexis, J. E., and J. C. Janvier.  1991.  ETUDE PRELIMINAIRE
DE LA POLITIQUE HAITIENNE EN MATIERE D ENVIRONMENT.  Cahier du
GERPE No. 91-04.  Quebec, Canada: University Larval.

3. See for example, Ostrom V., D. Feeny, and H. Pict.  1993. 
RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES,
ALTERNATIVES, AND CHOICES.  San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies Press.

4. Land use policy assessment and reform began under the World
Bank-sponsored forestry project, suspended because of the
political turbulence in 1991.  The government should reassess and
continue that work.  

5. The government assigned a committee in 1991 to assess MARNDR
and recommend a new structure more responsive to rural needs. 
Thwarted by the 1991 "coup d'etat," the government should
reconsider and continue this work.

6. Technical details on needed productivity-enhancing
investments are discussed in EPAT/MUCIA Working Paper 17 by T.
Anderson White (1994) mentioned in note 1.